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European Parliamentary 
Elections Act 1999: the 
constitutional issues
by Gabriele Ganz
In this article, Professor Gabriele Ganz of Southampton University writes about the 
passage through Parliament of the Bill preceding the European Parliamentary Elections 
Act 1999, which received Royal Assent on 14 January 1999, and argues that it raises 
two fundamental constitutional issues: first, the voting system chosen for elections 
to the European Parliament and, secondly, the role played by the House of Lords on 
the eve of the reform of its composition.
The European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999 ('the Act')is only the second one to become law under the Parliament Act 1949. Unlike its predecessor, the War Crimes Act 1991, 
the Bill was foreshadowed in the Labour Party manifesto of 
1997, although not the precise voting system. It was not, 
however, fought on purely party political lines. There was 
considerable opposition within the Labour ranks in the House 
of Commons and, though the votes in the House of Lords could 
not have been won without the support of hereditary peers, they 
also could not have been won without cross-party1 support and 
help from the cross-benches. Earl Russell, a Liberal Democrat 
peer, said, 'It is not a representation of the people Bill; it is a 
representation of the parties Bill', and it was claimed that the 
unelected peers were protecting the power of the electorate. 
Nevertheless, the unprecedented confrontation between the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords, culminating in the 
use of the Parliament Acts had zero effect. The government got 
the Bill passed intact in time to prepare for the European 
parliamentary elections in June 1999. The Act thus provides a 
textbook illustration of the dominance of the Executive over the 
Legislature. Whether a reformed House of Lords would have led 
to a different result is an open question.
CLOSED LIST SYSTEM
The story starts with the Labour manifesto of 1997, which 
stated:
'We have long supported a proportional voting system jor election to 
the European Parliament.'
The brevity7 of this promise, which did not mention a specific 
voting system, was to play an important part in the 
confrontation with the House of Lords. Interestingly, the Bill 
was not included in the Queen's Speech but was brought 
forward following persuasion by the Liberal Democrats.
Trouble started before the Bill was even published, in October 
1997, over a code of conduct gagging Labour MEPs from
discussing publicly the new selection procedure for MEPs. 
Criticism by the opposition parties as well as rebel Labour MEPs 
greeted publication of the Bill, which provided for the 'closed 
list' system of proportional representation. The country is 
divided into electoral regions (nine in England, and one each for 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, s. 1 substituting s. 2 of7 ' o
the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978) and the number of 
seats allocated for each region is laid down in the Bill (i.e. 71 for 
England, 8 tor Scotland, S for Wales and 3 for Northern Ireland, 
new s. 2(4); Sch. 1 sets out the number of seats allocated for 
each English region). The voter in each region can vote either
O O ' O
for a registered party or for an independent candidate. However, 
the seats allocated to a party are filled from the party's list in the 
order in which they appear on the list. In other words, the voter 
cannot show a preference for any candidate on the list, but only 
vote for a party; not an individual, unless they are standing as an 
independent. This raises the fundamental issue of what elections 
are for.
Although the basic division of opinion between those who 
support 'first past the post' in preference to proportional 
representation formed an undercurrent in the debates, as some 
of the protagonists openly declared, it was conceded by the 
opposition that proportional representation was a manifesto 
commitment and had to be accepted as such, particularly in the 
House of Lords. The Liberal Democrats, in principle, supported 
a different system of proportional representation, namely the 
single transferable vote, but did not think it was appropriate in 
the circumstances of these elections. The debate was thus 
narrowly focused on whether the system should be one of open 
or closed party- lists. In the former the voters can choose the 
candidate they prefer from the list, while in the latter the order 
is determined by the party' (a system used by the majority of 
European voters). The higher a candidate's position on the list, 
the better are his or her chances of election.
The government argued that closed lists would give a bettero o o
chance of election to women and ethnic minority candidates,
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and those with a particular expertise, and that voters would not 
have much knowledge about individual candidates in 
constituencies the size of regions as envisaged in the Bill. It was 
also reiterated that a candidate in an open list system could be 
elected with fewer votes than a candidate who was not elected. 
This would only have been true as between candidates on the list 
of different parties, not of candidates on the same party7 list, 
under the open list system proposed in the opposition 
amendment, which was successful in the House of Lords. Under 
this amendment the voter would vote for an individual candidate 
on a party list, or an independent candidate, and the total vote 
for all the candidates of each party would determine the vote for 
that party and thus the number of seats, which would be 
allocated in accordance with the number of votes each candidate 
received.
The argument in favour of giving the voter a choice of 
candidate is the classic argument of accountability. As Earl 
Russell put it, perhaps too simplistically:
'All members of elected assemblies ... will try to please those Jrom 
whom their title to sit comes.'
Open lists would enable the voter to get rid of unpopular 
candidates and, conversely, to decide between different 
candidates on the basis of moral and ethical questions such as 
capital punishment. However, this argument begs the question 
of whether MPs' primary loyalty is now to their party rather than 
to their constituents or their consciences. Without doubt, the 
closed list system tightens the grip of party loyalty.
This grip is tightened even 
more depending on the way 
in which the party lists are 
compiled. This is not dealt 
with in the Bill but is left to 
the political parties to decide. 
It was, however, very 
germane to, and much 
canvassed in the debates on, 
open or closed lists. We have 
already referred to the 
problems of Labour MEPs 
opposed to the new selection 
procedure. Each party' has 
adopted different procedures 
for compiling its party' lists. 
The crucial issues are who in 
the party decides whether 
candidates get onto the lists 
and the order in which they 
appear on the lists. The Liberal Democrats and Conservatives 
allow party members to determine the order of candidates on 
the lists, subject in the case of the Conservatives to prior vetting 
by a panel of local party chairmen. Labour adopted a 
complicated procedure which involved a ballot of party' 
members at the first stage, but left the crucial decision of who 
should go on the final lists and the order in which they are listed 
to a panel consisting of members and nominees of the NationalI o
Executive Committee and regional representatives of the party. 
This puts enormous power into the hands of the party' 
leadership over who will be elected and this will strengthen their 
party loyalty rather than their independence.
During the second reading debate in the House of Commons 
in November 1997, the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, under 
pressure from the Liberal Democrats and the constitutional 
reform group Charter 88, agreed to give further consideration 
to the open list system used in Belgium. He placed an 
explanatory paper in the library of the Commons and 
commissioned research from NOE Though it was soon 
rumoured that the closed list would remain, Mr Straw did not 
announce his rejection of the Belgian system until a late stage of 
the Bill, in March 1998. At the report stage he gave in detail the 
reason why the Belgian system should be opposed (namely, that 
under the Belgian system where the voter can vote either for the 
party- or an individual on the list, it is possible for a candidate 
who is higher on the list to be elected with fewer votes than
O
someone lower down because of the way the quota is allocated).
ROLE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
When the Bill was debated for the first time in the House of 
Lords, in April 1998, there was much opposition across the 
political spectrum to the closed list system. This was a foretaste 
of things to come. Strangely, the confrontation between the two 
houses took another six months to materialise. Although a 
Conservative amendment proposing the open list system, which 
was finally successful in the House of Lords, was first put 
forward in June 1998, it was not put to the vote because it was 
getting late. At report stage it was moved again but not put to the 
vote, on the grounds that it would not have received enough 
support. It was not until the third reading on 20 October 1998 
that the amendment was passed for the first time by a majority 
of 25. This vote began the game of ping-pong which sent the Bill 
back and forth between the two Houses for an unprecedented 
five times. Was this 'a wholly improper abuse of power' by the 
House of Lords, which was only made possible by enlisting the 
aid of hereditary peers, or were the unelected peers acting as a 
bulwark of democracy by using the powers given to them by the 
Parliament Acts? The truth lies somewhere between these two 
extremes.
Was the House of Lords Acting unconstitutionally? The 
Salisbury Convention, evolved in 1945 by the then leader of the 
opposition in the House of Lords, states that the House of Lords 
may amend, but not reject or wreck, a Bill contained in the 
government's manifesto. Lord Mackay, the opposition 
spokesman in the House of Lords, expressly denied breach of 
this convention because the manifesto only contained a pledge 
to introduce proportional representation for European elections 
but said nothing about the voting system to be adopted. The 
Lords were not rejecting the Bill at second reading, as happened 
in the War Crimes Bill, nor were they passing a wrecking 
amendment because it did not remove proportional 
representation from the Bill. The Lords, by their amendment 
passed on 20 October 1998, were asking the Commons to think 
again. What was unprecedented was that the Bill was batted 
back and forth between the two houses five times.
It was alleged by one peer that no Bill over the past 30 years 
had been amended bv the same amendment more than twice. It 
was, of course, not the same amendment which ping-ponged 
five times between the houses. The rules of the game were theo
subject of a brief exchange between Lord Carter, the Labour 
Chief Whip and Viscount Cranborne, then the opposition leader 
in the House of Lords, when the Lords insisted on their
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amendment after its rejection by the Commons. Lord Carter put 
it succinctly when he said, 'They [the Commons] cannot insist 
on it again. They have to produce an amendment in lieu'; 
otherwise the Bill would be lost. The Commons did pass an 
amendment in lieu, namely providing for a review of the 
operation of the system to report to Parliament within six 
months. This did not satisfy their lordships because the elections 
would still be held under the closed system and there was no 
guarantee that a review which was unfavourable to this system 
would be implemented. The Commons tried again with a second 
amendment in lieu by adding a new sub-section to the first 
amendment, spelling out that the review must consider how the 
open list might affect the result of an election. This was derided 
as 'not even a crumb from the rich man's table' by the 
opposition spokesman in the Lords. The Bill was sent back again 
to the Commons with the hope of a substantial compromise. 
This was not forthcoming, but a third amendment in lieu 
provided a new sub-section making the Secretary of State 
consult 'such persons appearing to him to be interested as he 
thinks appropriate' before appointing members of the review 
body. This was done on the penultimate day of the session. A few 
hours later it was contemptuously dismissed by the opposition 
spokesman in the Lords as hardlv moving us on a millimetre. The
1 J O
crunch came at 9pm, when the Lords for the fifth time insisted 
on their amendment and rejected the Commons' amendment in 
lieu by 212 tof 83 votes, with the result that the Bill was lost in 
that session.
Legitimate use of delaying power?
Was this a legitimate use of the delaying power given to the 
Lords by the Parliament Acts or a wholly improper abuse of 
power? There was a time when the view was held by the leader 
of the Conservative opposition in the Lords that this power 
could only be used in most exceptional circumstances on a 
matter of utmost gravity and importance (see G Ganz, 'War 
Crimes Act 1991 - Why no Constitutional Crisis?' [1992] 55 
MLR 87, 92). The issue of open or closed lists could probably 
not have been so classified (Lord Callaghan thought it was a 
second-level issue). However, in the 1970s, a different view 
prevailed and the Conservative opposition in the House of Lords 
insisted on their amendments to the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Amendment) Bill in 1975 and the Aircraft and 
Shipbuilding Industries Bill in 1976. Nevertheless, Lord 
Richard, the recently deposed Labour leader of the House of 
Lords, was probably right when he said:
'The other side is going to break the understanding that has arisen 
over a number ojyears under successive governments as to the 
circumstances in which this House should insist upon its position.'
Kaleidoscope of interests
The issue was, however, far more complex than a simple 
confrontation between the elected and the unelected house, the 
elected house against hereditary peers or a straightforward 
party-political battle. There was a kaleidoscope of interests, 
often self-contradictory, which shifted as the conflict reached its 
climax. Paradoxically, the Conservative party had nothing to gain 
from defeating the Bill as they, as well as the Liberal Democrats, 
were bound to win more euro-seats under a system of 
proportional representation. Some of the inveterate Labour 
opponents of the Bill had axes to grind such as being euro-
sceptics and/or against proportional representation. This was 
not, however, true of others who defied their parties on some 
votes against the Bill but were strongly pro-European and in 
favour of proportional representation. Conversely, some peers 
who supported the government confessed to being opposed to 
proportional representation. A number of peers spoke of how 
they changed sides as the conflict with the Commons escalated 
and they were afraid both of losing the Bill and of frustrating the 
will of the elected house. Earl Russell, a leading Liberal 
Democrat, illustrated these conflicting pressures most 
poignantly when, on the third occasion that the House of Lords 
voted against the government, he said he changed his mind five 
times before finally deciding to vote against the government once 
more. On the fourth occasion he did not vote, but on the fifth 
and last occasion, confronted with the choice, as he saw it, of 
killing the Bill or giving in to the government, he ended with the 
words of Lord Hailsham in a similar situation   'Let them have 
their silly way'   and voted with the government.
Peers were not alone in wrestling with their consciences; there 
was much opposition to closed lists among Labour MPs, and 
their speeches were gleefully quoted by Lord Mackay in the next 
debate in the House of Lords. He especially relished the remark 
of one Labour MP who thought it doubtful 'that a majority of the 
parliamentary Labour party7 is in favour of the closed-list system'. 
His opposition to the closed list system, however, conflicted with 
his belief that the views of the elected chamber must prevail. He 
salved his conscience by abstaining, but cheerfully predicted that 
the government would get a majority whatever the private view 
of the majority of his colleagues. In the vote the government had 
a majority- of 182. The moral of the tale was drawn by another 
Labour MP, Dr John Marek, who admitted that he would be 
dragooned through the government lobby:
'What legitimacy does the elected chamber have in comparison with 
the unelected chamber whose members may, by and large, vote according 
to their own judgment on the right course of action jor the country?'
Crucial role of cross-benchers
This statement is particularly true of the cross-benchers in the 
House of Lords, who do not take a party whip and who played 
such a crucial role in the votes on this Bill. Much play was made 
by the government of the number of hereditary peers who voted 
on each occasion and that the opposition won the votes because 
of the hereditary peers. This claim leaves out of account the role 
of the cross-benchers, the majority of whom are hereditary 
peers. Lord Alton asserted that without the votes of cross- 
benchers the government would have achieved their business on 
every occasion. There was, however, a revealing remark by Lord 
Mackay on the fifth round in the House of Lords, when he 
agreed with the minister that he was thinking, ' ... there are 
some people here I have never seen before and [was] wondering 
who they were'. This is an obvious reference to the 
'backwoodsmen' who had been summoned by the opposition to 
support them in the lobbies.
With hindsight it is possible to pick up clues in this last debate 
about the tensions within the Conservative party which were the 
backdrop against which this debate was held. Lord Garel-Jones 
refused to speculate in public about 'the motives of the Shadow 
Cabinet in inviting us to vote against the Government yet again'.o o J o
Even more significantly, the then leader of the opposition in the
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Lords commented immediately after the vote in which the 
government was defeated:o
'We are aware of the limitations on the rights of this House ... and 
I hope that we will behave accordingly when the Bill is reintroduced.'
Two weeks later Viscount Cranborne was dramatically sacked 
by the leader of the opposition, William Hague, for making a 
deal with the government behind Mr Hague's back which would 
have allowed 91 hereditary peers to be reprieved temporarily in 
return tor opposition peers not obstructing the Bill announced 
in the Queen's Speech to abolish the right of hereditary peers to 
sit in the Lords. These events foreshadowed the arrangementso
for the subsequent passage of the European Parliamentary 
Elections Bill through the Lords, but, first, the Bill had to pass 
through the Commons again in accordance with the procedure 
under the Parliament Acts.
USE OF THE PARLIAMENT ACTS
By the time the Bill returned to the Commons in the new 
session, the year which has to elapse between the first and last 
occasions it is passed in the House of Commons, had already 
expired. The government put before the House a guillotine 
motion which was alleged to be the most severe that had evero
been introduced. It allowed only four hours to debate the 
motion and all stages of the Bill. Half of the available time was 
spent debating the guillotine motion and the rest on the second 
reading debate, so no amendments could be discussed. To 
comply with the Parliament Acts, the Bill which is reintroduced 
must be the same as the former Bill except for amendments 
agreed between the two houses. Because of this provision the 
proposal for a review of the closed list system, which was 
rejected by the Lords, was not included in the Bill on the second 
occasion. There was, however, a change in the 
explanatory memorandum, because, since the 
passage of the Human PJghts Act 1998, the minister 
in charge of the Bill had to state whether the Bill 
complied with that Act. It was alleged by the 
opposition in the debate that the Bill was arguably in 
breach of art. 3 of the First Protocol of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which provides for the 
holding of free elections. This can only be decided by a court.
Contrary to dire prophecies as to what would happen to the 
Bill in the Lords, another deal was agreed between the 
Conservative peers and the government about the timetable for 
the Bill, so that it could become law in January in time for the 
European Parliamentary elections to be held in June under the 
new system. Instead of giving the Bill a second reading and then 
having a protracted committee stage, the opposition put down a 
reasoned amendment declining to give the Bill a second reading 
because it included an undemocratic closed list system for which 
there was no mandate at the general election. Paradoxically, the 
passing of this amendment would help the government by 
speeding up the passage of the Bill which could become law 
under the Parliament Acts after its rejection for the second time 
by the House of Lords. Therefore, a vote for the amendment was 
in reality a vote for the Bill. The only way out of this dilemma 
was to abstain and this was the route taken bv two inveterate 
opponents of the closed list system, one of whom nevertheless 
wanted the Bill to become law and the other of whom did not. 
One peer abstained because he headed one of the lists as
prospective Conservative candidate. As he put it succinctly:
'To votejbr the Government is promoting my candidature and, in the 
particular and peculiar circumstances of this evening, to votejbr the 
amendment has the same effect.'
Others who spoke passionately in favour of the Bill abstained, 
but most speakers, in spite of the paradox, voted for the second 
reading if they supported the Bill or for the amendment if they 
opposed it. The 'serried ranks of the Conservative Benches' 
carried the day by 167 to 73, and the Bill was returned to the 
Commons to be prepared for the Royal Assent. Lord 
Strathclyde, the new leader of the Conservative peers, taunted 
the government with having suffered 'an unprecedented 
humiliation' - no doubt with tongue in cheek. But neither was 
the defeat 'the death rattle of the ancien regime '. Some hereditary 
peers were likely to be reprieved to fight another day.
CONCLUSION
Is it a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying 
nothing? Why did the unprecedented game of ping-pong with 
the Lords yield no results at all? On two previous confrontations 
earlier in the session the Lords had won notable victories: on 
tuition fees for English students at Scottish universities the 
government promised an independent review, which was 
accepted by the Lords; in the case of lowering the age of consent 
for homosexuals to 16, the Lords' defeat of the clause, which 
had been added to the Crime and Disorder Bill on a free vote in 
the Commons, led to the withdrawal of the clause by the 
government with a promise of new legislation in the next session 
(which was again defeated in the Lords). In each case there were 
special circumstances leading to a deal or climbdown. The two 
houses when in conflict are engaged in a game of poker with 
each side trying to bluff the other into climbing down.
With hindsight the unprecedented confrontation over the 
European Parliamentary Elections Bill cannot be seen in 
isolation from the battle over House of Lords' reform which was 
going on behind the scenes. We now know there were divisions 
in the Conservative Party over how to handle this issue and that 
the leadership was opposed to a deal and determined to face 
down the government. The suspicion cannot be avoided that this 
was a dress rehearsal for the coming battle over Lords reform so 
far as the Conservative peers were concerned. Having forced the 
government to use the Parliament Acts, the government was 
then handed the Bill on a plate, as a result of a deal negotiated 
with the Conservative peers which cannot be divorced from the 
proposal to reprieve 91 hereditary members of the House of 
Lords.
As we have seen, however, opposition to the Bill was not just 
a party political battle but received support across the political 
spectrum and from cross-benchers and bishops. There was 
much heart-searching among these peers about frustrating the 
will of the elected house, particularly when the confrontation 
between the houses was reaching its climax,. It was the Earl of
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Onslow, ready to act as a football hooligan to further Lords' 
reform, who pointed the moral when he said:
' ... this is a perfect example of why this House should be properly 
reformed. When it is properly reformed, we can use the powers that we 
have with legitimacy and pride rather than be blackmailed because we 
are told that we are all idiots of hereditary Peers.'
The Bill to abolish the right of hereditary peers to be members 
ot the House of Lords was introduced in the House of Commons 
on 19 January. In a statement to both houses, the government 
confirmed that it was minded to accept an amendment to the 
Bill, when it reached the Lords, to temporarily reprieve some 
hereditary peers until there is a fully reformed second chamber. 
That depended, however, 'on the extent to which the normal 
conventions relating to the government's legislative programme 
are being observed'   a euphemism for not blocking the Bill. 
(This amendment to reprieve 92 hereditary peers has now been 
passed in the Lords.) The statement accompanied a White Paper 
setting out the government's proposals for Lords' reform both in 
the short term (the transitional house) and longer-term reform, 
which would be considered by a Royal Commission to report by 
the end of 1999 on the role, function and composition of a
second chamber. The terms of reference make it clear that the 
House of Commons must remain the pre-eminent chamber of 
Parliament. Ominously, the government, in setting out its o\vn 
views on the powers of a reformed second chamber, considers 
that they should be reduced, rather than restricting their 
exercise by 'institutionalising the understandings' under which 
the house now operates   understandings which were evolved 
precisely because the house was unreformed. In other words the 
government does not envisage that a second chamber endowed 
with greater legitimacy should act as a better check on the 
Commons. The Commons will still normally be dominated by 
the government formed from the party with a majority of MPs, 
unless there is electoral reform more radical than that proposed 
by the Jenkins Commission. Plus $a change, plus c'est la meme 
chose. ©
Professor Gabriele Ganz
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Misplaced trust?
by Peter Willoughby
The trust concept has been used for more than 800 years as a 
mechanism to protect and conserve family wealth. However, in 
recent years, failure to set up trusts correctly and to administer 
them scrupulously has resulted in litigation. Professor Peter 
Willoughby outlines the dangers and pitfalls of setting up and 
administering trusts.
O ver the last 30 years there has been widespread and increasing use of trusts as a way of holding personal wealth. The trust concept is one with more than 800 
years of development, originally in Lngland but more recently in 
many other jurisdictions. Trusts have been created for many 
reasons but generally the overriding need is the protection and 
conservation of family wealth. One of the most important 
advantages of a trust is that it provides a convenient and flexible 
way of ensuring that the benefit of assets is enjoyed by members 
of a family through more than one generation, without the 
inconvenience, publicity and expense that can occur where it is 
necessary to obtain a grant of probate or letters of administration 
or the equivalent, in several jurisdictions, on the death of a 
wealthy person. It may be that other advantages can be obtained,
such as the mitigation of tax liabilities and the sheltering of family 
assets from potential creditors.
Unfortunately in more recent times trusts have all too 
frequently been marketed as 'products' by banks, accountancy 
firms and even lawyers, without proper attention to the essential 
legal requirements of a valid trust. In many instances, aggressive 
marketing by people who have not understood the need to set up 
trusts correctly and then to administer them scrupulously has 
resulted in litigation which is often multi-jurisdictional and very 
expensive. The practical implications of matters such as heirship 
and creditors' rights, together with the dangers of retaining direct 
or indirect control in the person creating the trust, have been 
underestimated. This has resulted in challenges by creditors, 
disinherited heirs, former spouses and revenue authorities.
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